The Resource Intellectual Property Rights and Competition in Standard Setting : Objectives and Tensions

Intellectual Property Rights and Competition in Standard Setting : Objectives and Tensions

Label
Intellectual Property Rights and Competition in Standard Setting : Objectives and Tensions
Title
Intellectual Property Rights and Competition in Standard Setting
Title remainder
Objectives and Tensions
Creator
Subject
Genre
Language
eng
Member of
Cataloging source
MiAaPQ
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Torti, Valerio
Dewey number
346.048
LC call number
K1401.T678 2016
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
dictionaries
Series statement
Routledge Research in Intellectual Property Ser
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
Jurisdiction
Label
Intellectual Property Rights and Competition in Standard Setting : Objectives and Tensions
Link
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oulaw/detail.action?docID=4014666
Instantiates
Publication
Copyright
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
multicolored
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Forewords -- Table of cases -- Table of legislation -- Introduction -- PART ONE IPRs, competition and the standards -- 1 The objectives of competition law -- 1 Interpreting the goals of competition -- 1.1 Different policies and different objectives -- 2 Competition law as a means to achieving different aims -- 2.1 Ensuring an effective competitive process -- 2.1.1 Effective competition: a means or an aim? -- 2.2 Promoting consumer welfare and consumer choice -- 2.2.1 Consumer welfare v total welfare -- 2.2.2 Welfare standards in the EU and the US -- 2.2.3 Consumer surplus as enforcement standard -- 2.2.4 Societal welfare as ultimate aim -- 2.3 Enhancing efficiency -- 2.3.1 Allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency -- 2.3.2 Monopoly and the pursuit of efficiencies -- 2.3.3 Efficiency and the objective of competition law -- 2.4 Pursuing market integration -- 2.4.1 The positions of the EU Commission and the courts -- 2.4.2 The relation between welfare and market integration -- 2.4.3 Market integration and the role of competition -- 3 Conclusion -- 2 Goals of IP law and interplay with competition -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Intellectual property rights (IPRs) -- 2.1 Justification and scope of IPRs -- 2.2 Objectives of IPRs -- 2.2.1 Promotion of competition -- 2.2.2 Dynamic efficiency -- 2.2.3 Consumer and societal welfare -- 3 IPRs and Article 102 TFEU -- 3.1 Volvo -- 3.2 Magill -- 3.3 Tierce Ladbroke -- 3.4 Oscar Bronner -- 3.5 IMS Health -- 3.6 Microsoft -- 4 IPRs and Section 2 of the US Sherman Act -- 4.1 Xerox -- 4.2 Kodak -- 4.3 Other relevant cases and principles -- 4.3.1 Essential facility doctrine -- 4.3.2 Monopoly leveraging doctrine -- 5 Conclusion -- 3 IPRs and standard setting: functions and rules -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Standards -- 2.1 De facto v de jure standards
  • 2.2 Proprietary and open standards -- 2.2.1 Proprietary v non-proprietary standards -- 2.2.2 Open v closed standards -- 2.2.3 Benefits of rewarding standards -- 3 Standardization processes -- 3.1 Fora and consortia -- 3.2 Formal standard-setting organizations -- 4 Policy rules -- 4.1 Search rules -- 4.2 Disclosure rules -- 4.2.1 Timing of disclosure -- 4.2.2 Subject of disclosure -- 4.3 Licensing rules -- 4.3.1 FRAND - meaning of fair and reasonable terms -- 4.3.1.1 The Georgia Pacific test -- 4.3.1.2 The numeric proportionality rule -- 4.3.1.3 Economic models -- 4.3.1.4 Arbitration -- 4.3.2 FRAND - meaning of non-discriminatory royalties -- 4.3.3 Alternative model to (F)RAND licensing -- 4.3.4 Patent pools -- 5 Conclusion -- PART TWO Anticompetitive conduct and standardization -- 4 The interaction IPRs-competition in standard setting -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The interplay between standards and competition -- 3 Patent ambush -- 3.1 US v EU approach -- 3.2 How to solve the ambush issue? -- 3.3 The (F)RAND model -- 3.4 Ex ante negotiation of royalties -- 3.4.1 Advantages of ex ante joint negotiation -- 3.4.2 Faults of ex ante joint negotiation -- 3.4.3 Collusion: bogus issue or real concern? -- 3.4.4 Failure of the model -- 3.5 Conclusive remarks on patent ambush -- 4 Mere breach of (F)RAND terms -- 4.1 Analysis of the conduct: alternative scenarios -- 4.2 US v EU approach -- 4.3 Competition: a means to curtail excessive prices? -- 5 Threat of injunctive relief -- 5.1 The Orange Book Standard case -- 5.2 Samsung v Apple in the Netherlands -- 5.3 The referral of Huawei v ZTE to the CJEU -- 5.4 The European Commission's decisions in Samsung and Motorola -- 5.5 eBay v MercExchange -- 5.6 The FTC's Google order -- 5.7 The Microsoft v Motorola legal battle -- 5.8 Judge Posner and the Federal Circuit in Apple v Motorola
  • 5.9 A view from the Asian legal framework -- 5.10 Further remarks on injunctive relief -- 6. Conclusion -- 5 The US approach in the standards-market power dichotomy -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Legal framework -- 3 Conduct -- 3.1 Patent ambush -- 3.1.1 Deception and the breach of Section 5 in Dell -- 3.1.1.1 VESA's preference for non-proprietary standards -- 3.1.1.2 Faults of the dissenting opinion -- 3.1.1.3 Prohibitions of the settlement agreement -- 3.1.1.4 Merits of the Commission's line of reasoning -- 3.1.2 Unocal's subversion of a governmental body -- 3.1.2.1 Risk of substantial harm to consumers -- 3.1.2.2 Weak attempt at defense -- 3.1.2.3 Enactment of the consent order -- 3.1.2.4 Core principles of the dispute -- 3.1.3 Rambus: a tale of standards in the standard -- 3.1.3.1 JEDEC policy and goals: at the origins of the dispute -- 3.1.3.2 Rambus and the initial debate -- 3.1.3.2.1 Initial administrative complaint -- 3.1.3.2.2 Rambus's defense -- 3.1.3.3 Decision of the Commission -- 3.1.3.3.1 Meaning of JEDEC rules -- 3.1.3.3.2 Exclusionary and deceptive conduct -- 3.1.3.3.3 Remedy -- 3.1.3.3.4 Concluding remarks -- 3.1.3.4 Rambus and the US Court of Appeals' reversal -- 3.1.3.4.1 Monopoly versus monopolization -- 3.1.3.4.2 Alternative scenarios -- 3.1.3.4.3 Importance of clear disclosure policy -- 3.1.3.5 Conclusive remarks on Rambus -- 3.2 Breach of (F)RAND commitments -- 3.2.1 Litigation in Qualcomm -- 3.2.1.1 Analysis of the company's behavior -- 3.2.1.2 Qualcomm and the judicial approach -- 3.2.1.2.1 Monopolization claim -- 3.2.1.2.2 Attempted monopolization claim -- 3.2.1.2.3 Unlawful maintenance of monopoly claim -- 3.2.1.3 Conclusive remarks on Qualcomm -- 4 Causation -- 4.1 Proof of causation in Rambus -- 4.1.1 Inference of causation -- 4.1.2 Clear and convincing evidence standard -- 4.1.3 Commission's analysis of causation
  • 4.1.4 Arguments of the US Court of Appeals -- 4.1.5 Preponderance of the evidence standard -- 4.2 Causality in Qualcomm -- 5 Anticompetitive effects -- 5.1 Rambus, Qualcomm and the debate on the effects -- 6 Fault and strict liability -- 6.1 Intent element in Rambus and Qualcomm -- 6.2 Dell and the inadvertent failure to disclose -- 6.2.1 Unknowing failure to disclose -- 6.2.2 Concept of negligence -- 7 Conclusion -- 6 The EU approach - abuse of dominance in standard setting -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Legal framework -- 3 Patent ambush and Rambus -- 3.1 Policy principles and abusive conduct -- 3.2 JEDEC policy and the duty of good faith -- 3.3 Relevant market and conduct -- 3.4 Assessment of the conduct -- 3.5 Commitments -- 3.6 Lessons from Rambus -- 4 Qualcomm and the breach of FRAND terms -- 4.1 "FRAND(ly)" licensing or exploitation? -- 5 Guidelines on horizontal co-operation agreements -- 5.1 Standardization agreements -- 5.2 Core policy principles -- 5.3 FRAND terms -- 5.4 Anticompetitive conduct -- 5.4.1 Restrictive practices in standardization -- 5.4.2 Efficiency gains -- 6 Conclusion -- PART THREE Reconciling IPRs and competition in standard setting -- 7 Suggested model and enforcement -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Promoting innovation and protecting competition -- 2.1 US v EU perspectives -- 2.2 IPRs, competition and the standards -- 3 Robust SSO rules as effective ex ante tools -- 3.1 Failure of (F)RAND and ex ante negotiation models -- 3.2 Optimal policy framework -- 3.2.1 Unilateral disclosure of the maximum licensing terms -- 3.2.2 Unilateral disclosure and SSO policies -- 3.2.3 Maximum cap in the views of US and EU antitrust enforcers -- 3.2.4 Practical implementation of the maximum cap -- 3.2.4.1 Time of disclosure -- 3.2.4.2 Means of disclosure -- 3.2.5 Search and disclosure commitments -- 3.2.5.1 Duty to search -- 3.2.5.2 Duty to disclose
  • 3.2.5.2.1 Time of disclosure -- 3.2.5.2.2 Subject of disclosure -- 3.2.5.2.3 Pending IPRs under the maximum cap -- 4 Enforcement of contract law as ex post possible remedy -- 4.1 Breach of contract -- 4.2 Limitations -- 4.3 Effectiveness -- 5 Enforcement of further private law remedies -- 5.1 Equitable estoppel -- 5.2 Implied license -- 5.3 Fraud -- 5.4 Patent misuse -- 5.4.1 Effectiveness -- 5.4.2 Main criticism -- 5.5 Conclusive remarks on alternative private remedies -- 6 Enforcement of competition as ex post effective remedy -- 6.1 Breach of the maximum cap -- 6.1.1 Competition as a means to regulate prices -- 6.2 Refusal to license -- 6.2.1 Alternative perspectives -- 6.2.2 The IPRs-competition dichotomy -- 6.2.3 Refusal to license in standard setting -- 6.3 Conclusive remarks on the role of competition -- 7 Conclusion -- 8 General conclusions -- Bibliography -- Index
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (277 pages)
Form of item
online
Isbn
9781317376651
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Note
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2019. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
  • (MiAaPQ)EBC4014666
  • (Au-PeEL)EBL4014666
  • (CaPaEBR)ebr11121934
  • (CaONFJC)MIL838595
  • (OCoLC)932330240
Label
Intellectual Property Rights and Competition in Standard Setting : Objectives and Tensions
Link
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oulaw/detail.action?docID=4014666
Publication
Copyright
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
multicolored
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Forewords -- Table of cases -- Table of legislation -- Introduction -- PART ONE IPRs, competition and the standards -- 1 The objectives of competition law -- 1 Interpreting the goals of competition -- 1.1 Different policies and different objectives -- 2 Competition law as a means to achieving different aims -- 2.1 Ensuring an effective competitive process -- 2.1.1 Effective competition: a means or an aim? -- 2.2 Promoting consumer welfare and consumer choice -- 2.2.1 Consumer welfare v total welfare -- 2.2.2 Welfare standards in the EU and the US -- 2.2.3 Consumer surplus as enforcement standard -- 2.2.4 Societal welfare as ultimate aim -- 2.3 Enhancing efficiency -- 2.3.1 Allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency -- 2.3.2 Monopoly and the pursuit of efficiencies -- 2.3.3 Efficiency and the objective of competition law -- 2.4 Pursuing market integration -- 2.4.1 The positions of the EU Commission and the courts -- 2.4.2 The relation between welfare and market integration -- 2.4.3 Market integration and the role of competition -- 3 Conclusion -- 2 Goals of IP law and interplay with competition -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Intellectual property rights (IPRs) -- 2.1 Justification and scope of IPRs -- 2.2 Objectives of IPRs -- 2.2.1 Promotion of competition -- 2.2.2 Dynamic efficiency -- 2.2.3 Consumer and societal welfare -- 3 IPRs and Article 102 TFEU -- 3.1 Volvo -- 3.2 Magill -- 3.3 Tierce Ladbroke -- 3.4 Oscar Bronner -- 3.5 IMS Health -- 3.6 Microsoft -- 4 IPRs and Section 2 of the US Sherman Act -- 4.1 Xerox -- 4.2 Kodak -- 4.3 Other relevant cases and principles -- 4.3.1 Essential facility doctrine -- 4.3.2 Monopoly leveraging doctrine -- 5 Conclusion -- 3 IPRs and standard setting: functions and rules -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Standards -- 2.1 De facto v de jure standards
  • 2.2 Proprietary and open standards -- 2.2.1 Proprietary v non-proprietary standards -- 2.2.2 Open v closed standards -- 2.2.3 Benefits of rewarding standards -- 3 Standardization processes -- 3.1 Fora and consortia -- 3.2 Formal standard-setting organizations -- 4 Policy rules -- 4.1 Search rules -- 4.2 Disclosure rules -- 4.2.1 Timing of disclosure -- 4.2.2 Subject of disclosure -- 4.3 Licensing rules -- 4.3.1 FRAND - meaning of fair and reasonable terms -- 4.3.1.1 The Georgia Pacific test -- 4.3.1.2 The numeric proportionality rule -- 4.3.1.3 Economic models -- 4.3.1.4 Arbitration -- 4.3.2 FRAND - meaning of non-discriminatory royalties -- 4.3.3 Alternative model to (F)RAND licensing -- 4.3.4 Patent pools -- 5 Conclusion -- PART TWO Anticompetitive conduct and standardization -- 4 The interaction IPRs-competition in standard setting -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The interplay between standards and competition -- 3 Patent ambush -- 3.1 US v EU approach -- 3.2 How to solve the ambush issue? -- 3.3 The (F)RAND model -- 3.4 Ex ante negotiation of royalties -- 3.4.1 Advantages of ex ante joint negotiation -- 3.4.2 Faults of ex ante joint negotiation -- 3.4.3 Collusion: bogus issue or real concern? -- 3.4.4 Failure of the model -- 3.5 Conclusive remarks on patent ambush -- 4 Mere breach of (F)RAND terms -- 4.1 Analysis of the conduct: alternative scenarios -- 4.2 US v EU approach -- 4.3 Competition: a means to curtail excessive prices? -- 5 Threat of injunctive relief -- 5.1 The Orange Book Standard case -- 5.2 Samsung v Apple in the Netherlands -- 5.3 The referral of Huawei v ZTE to the CJEU -- 5.4 The European Commission's decisions in Samsung and Motorola -- 5.5 eBay v MercExchange -- 5.6 The FTC's Google order -- 5.7 The Microsoft v Motorola legal battle -- 5.8 Judge Posner and the Federal Circuit in Apple v Motorola
  • 5.9 A view from the Asian legal framework -- 5.10 Further remarks on injunctive relief -- 6. Conclusion -- 5 The US approach in the standards-market power dichotomy -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Legal framework -- 3 Conduct -- 3.1 Patent ambush -- 3.1.1 Deception and the breach of Section 5 in Dell -- 3.1.1.1 VESA's preference for non-proprietary standards -- 3.1.1.2 Faults of the dissenting opinion -- 3.1.1.3 Prohibitions of the settlement agreement -- 3.1.1.4 Merits of the Commission's line of reasoning -- 3.1.2 Unocal's subversion of a governmental body -- 3.1.2.1 Risk of substantial harm to consumers -- 3.1.2.2 Weak attempt at defense -- 3.1.2.3 Enactment of the consent order -- 3.1.2.4 Core principles of the dispute -- 3.1.3 Rambus: a tale of standards in the standard -- 3.1.3.1 JEDEC policy and goals: at the origins of the dispute -- 3.1.3.2 Rambus and the initial debate -- 3.1.3.2.1 Initial administrative complaint -- 3.1.3.2.2 Rambus's defense -- 3.1.3.3 Decision of the Commission -- 3.1.3.3.1 Meaning of JEDEC rules -- 3.1.3.3.2 Exclusionary and deceptive conduct -- 3.1.3.3.3 Remedy -- 3.1.3.3.4 Concluding remarks -- 3.1.3.4 Rambus and the US Court of Appeals' reversal -- 3.1.3.4.1 Monopoly versus monopolization -- 3.1.3.4.2 Alternative scenarios -- 3.1.3.4.3 Importance of clear disclosure policy -- 3.1.3.5 Conclusive remarks on Rambus -- 3.2 Breach of (F)RAND commitments -- 3.2.1 Litigation in Qualcomm -- 3.2.1.1 Analysis of the company's behavior -- 3.2.1.2 Qualcomm and the judicial approach -- 3.2.1.2.1 Monopolization claim -- 3.2.1.2.2 Attempted monopolization claim -- 3.2.1.2.3 Unlawful maintenance of monopoly claim -- 3.2.1.3 Conclusive remarks on Qualcomm -- 4 Causation -- 4.1 Proof of causation in Rambus -- 4.1.1 Inference of causation -- 4.1.2 Clear and convincing evidence standard -- 4.1.3 Commission's analysis of causation
  • 4.1.4 Arguments of the US Court of Appeals -- 4.1.5 Preponderance of the evidence standard -- 4.2 Causality in Qualcomm -- 5 Anticompetitive effects -- 5.1 Rambus, Qualcomm and the debate on the effects -- 6 Fault and strict liability -- 6.1 Intent element in Rambus and Qualcomm -- 6.2 Dell and the inadvertent failure to disclose -- 6.2.1 Unknowing failure to disclose -- 6.2.2 Concept of negligence -- 7 Conclusion -- 6 The EU approach - abuse of dominance in standard setting -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Legal framework -- 3 Patent ambush and Rambus -- 3.1 Policy principles and abusive conduct -- 3.2 JEDEC policy and the duty of good faith -- 3.3 Relevant market and conduct -- 3.4 Assessment of the conduct -- 3.5 Commitments -- 3.6 Lessons from Rambus -- 4 Qualcomm and the breach of FRAND terms -- 4.1 "FRAND(ly)" licensing or exploitation? -- 5 Guidelines on horizontal co-operation agreements -- 5.1 Standardization agreements -- 5.2 Core policy principles -- 5.3 FRAND terms -- 5.4 Anticompetitive conduct -- 5.4.1 Restrictive practices in standardization -- 5.4.2 Efficiency gains -- 6 Conclusion -- PART THREE Reconciling IPRs and competition in standard setting -- 7 Suggested model and enforcement -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Promoting innovation and protecting competition -- 2.1 US v EU perspectives -- 2.2 IPRs, competition and the standards -- 3 Robust SSO rules as effective ex ante tools -- 3.1 Failure of (F)RAND and ex ante negotiation models -- 3.2 Optimal policy framework -- 3.2.1 Unilateral disclosure of the maximum licensing terms -- 3.2.2 Unilateral disclosure and SSO policies -- 3.2.3 Maximum cap in the views of US and EU antitrust enforcers -- 3.2.4 Practical implementation of the maximum cap -- 3.2.4.1 Time of disclosure -- 3.2.4.2 Means of disclosure -- 3.2.5 Search and disclosure commitments -- 3.2.5.1 Duty to search -- 3.2.5.2 Duty to disclose
  • 3.2.5.2.1 Time of disclosure -- 3.2.5.2.2 Subject of disclosure -- 3.2.5.2.3 Pending IPRs under the maximum cap -- 4 Enforcement of contract law as ex post possible remedy -- 4.1 Breach of contract -- 4.2 Limitations -- 4.3 Effectiveness -- 5 Enforcement of further private law remedies -- 5.1 Equitable estoppel -- 5.2 Implied license -- 5.3 Fraud -- 5.4 Patent misuse -- 5.4.1 Effectiveness -- 5.4.2 Main criticism -- 5.5 Conclusive remarks on alternative private remedies -- 6 Enforcement of competition as ex post effective remedy -- 6.1 Breach of the maximum cap -- 6.1.1 Competition as a means to regulate prices -- 6.2 Refusal to license -- 6.2.1 Alternative perspectives -- 6.2.2 The IPRs-competition dichotomy -- 6.2.3 Refusal to license in standard setting -- 6.3 Conclusive remarks on the role of competition -- 7 Conclusion -- 8 General conclusions -- Bibliography -- Index
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (277 pages)
Form of item
online
Isbn
9781317376651
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Note
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2019. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
  • (MiAaPQ)EBC4014666
  • (Au-PeEL)EBL4014666
  • (CaPaEBR)ebr11121934
  • (CaONFJC)MIL838595
  • (OCoLC)932330240

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